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Abstract. In recent years, the effort to formalize erotetic inferences—i.e., in-
ferences to and from questions—has become a central concern for those work-
ing in erotetic logic. However, few have sought to formulate a proof theory
for these inferences. To fill this lacuna, we construct a calculus for (classes
of) sequents that are sound and complete for two species of erotetic inferences
studied by Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL): erotetic evocation and erotetic im-
plication. While an effort has been made to axiomatize the former in a sequent
system, there is currently no proof theory for the latter. Moreover, the extant
axiomatization of erotetic evocation fails to capture its defeasible character
and provides no rules for introducing or eliminating question-forming opera-
tors. In contrast, our calculus encodes defeasibility conditions on sequents and
provides rules governing the introduction and elimination of erotetic formulas.
We demonstrate that an elimination theorem holds for a version of the cut
rule that applies to both declarative and erotetic formulas and that the rules
for the axiomatic account of question evocation in IEL are admissible in our
system.
Erotetic Logic, Proof Theory, Sequent Calculus, Defeasible Reasoning
Most work in erotetic logic has been devoted to the relationship between ques-
tions and answers [6, 7, 1, 10, 8, 5]. In recent years, however, the effort to formalize
erotetic inferences—i.e., inferences to and from questions—has become a central
concern for those working in the subfield, e.g., [9, 18, 23, 4, 22]. Most contribu-
tions in this area deal with the semantic relations that hold among questions and
statements. Although no formal study of these inferences will be complete without
a treatment of the rules governing the construction of proofs, few have sought to
formulate a proof theory for erotetic inferences.1 This paper aims, among other
things, to fill this lacuna.
While several accounts of erotetic inferences have been put forward, Wi´sniewski’s
Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL) is among the most developed. There are two
types of inference that IEL seeks to formalize. The first type covers cases in which
one infers a question from a set of declarative statements. The second type refers
This work has benefited from the comments and suggestions of Andrzej Wi´sniewski and two
anynomous referees at Studia Logica.
1Work on Socratic Proofs represents a notable exception. First identified by [24], Socratic
Proofs are sequences of questions regarding the derivability of formulas that end with a question
whose affirmative answer is, in a sense, evident. Systems for such proofs typically consist in
hypersequent calculi defined over erotetically-enriched languages. Other contributions include
[26, 13].
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to instances when one infers a question on the basis of another question and a
(possibly empty) set of declaratives. According to IEL, the relation of erotetic evo-
cation underwrites valid instances of the first type, while that of erotetic implication
underwrites those of the second.
Recently, [25] has attempted to axiomatize erotetic evocation in a sequent cal-
culus defined over a classical propositional language enriched to include formal
counterparts to questions—so-called erotetic formulas. This calculus represents an
important contribution to the development of a proof theory for erotetic inferences.
Unfortunately, the work suffers three limitations. First, although evocative infer-
ences are defeated when one or more answers to the evoked question are entailed
by the premises (i.e., when the question is already answered by the statements that
give rise to it), Wi´sniewski’s system does not capture the defeasible nature of this
relation but instead utilizes axioms and rules that prevent defeat from arising.2
Second, the system leaves erotetic implication completely unrepresented. Finally,
there are no rules governing the introduction or elimination of erotetic formulas.
The absence of such rules obscures the role that erotetic evocations play in our
wider inferential economy.
This paper seeks to overcome each of these limitations by articulating a sequent
calculus that represents species of both erotetic evocation and erotetic implication
and that provides introduction and elimination rules for the interrogative operator.
We follow [25] in limiting our target to erotetic inferences expressed in the language
of classical propositional logic (CPL) extended to include erotetic formulas. Dealing
with sequents formulated in an extension of CPL provides a simple and natural
starting point for proof-theoretic investigations and enables us to utilize a set-based
variant of Gentzen’s sequent calculus for classical logic, LK.
Our object of inquiry is erotetic evocation and a species of erotetic implication
known as regular erotetic implication (see Definition 9). Restricting our attention
to this species of erotetic implication has the benefit of yielding inferential relations
that are closed under transitivity. Consequently, we are able to include a version
of the cut rule that applies to both statements and questions and to show that it
may be eliminated from any proof, thereby demonstrating that our system enjoys
the prized property of cut-elimination exhibited by LK.
If the calculus proposed here is to be a genuine proof theory and not just a for-
mal auxiliary to the semantic account of erotetic inference, it must be intelligible in
terms of primitive non-semantic concepts. But unlike the natural deduction and se-
quent systems for CPL, which may legitimately appeal to the notion of proof rather
than that of truth-value, it is not clear that there is an antecedently intelligible no-
tion of proof that applies to both statements and questions. What, then, is the
appropriate interpretant for an erotetic proof theory? In answering this question,
the paper does something else that is novel. It offers an informal interpretation of
erotetic sequents, the proof-theoretic analogs to erotetic inferences, in terms of the
normative statuses that attach to the speech acts of asking questions and making as-
sertions. Roughly, the idea is to read sequents as saying that anyone who is entitled
to assert/ask the statements/questions in the antecedent is entitled to assert/ask
the statements/questions of its succedent. There are thus two primitive concepts
2The defeasible character of erotetic evocation has been captured by [14], who provides a proof
theory for question evocation in the framework of adaptive logic. The present work incorporates
and extends many of the insights of [14] and does so in the context of a cut-free sequent calculus.
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invoked: that of being entitled to assert (a.k.a assertional entitlement) and that of
being entitled to ask a question (a.k.a erotetic entitlement). This interpretation of
erotetic arguments represents an extension of the normative-pragmatic accounts of
(assertional) inferences and of various non-assertional speech acts (though not of
asking questions) offered by [2] and [12], respectively. While it is not the goal of this
paper to defend the sufficiency of this interpretation, we hope that the technical
results of the paper will provide fodder for such a defense.3
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we formally define the erotetic
inferences that constitute the targets of our proof theory. In Section 2, we introduce
our sequent calculus for defeasible inferences, LK?. After explaining the declarative
and erotetic rules of the system, we proceed to prove soundness and completeness
for our target erotetic inferences—erotetic evocation and regular erotetic implication
(Section 3). We also prove a cut-elimination theorem for the calculus (Section 4).
We then demonstrate that the axioms and primitive rules that [25] provides for
erotetic evocation are admissible in LK? (Section 5). We conclude by exploring
possible directions of future research on erotetic calculi.
1. Erotetic Inferences
In what follows, we assume a language of CPL, Ld, that consists of a countable
set of atoms denoted by p, q, r, p1 ..., pn, q1 ..., qn, r1 ..., rn, and formulas formed in
the usual manner by the standard connectives ∧,∨,→,¬. We refer to the members
of Ld as d-wffs. In order to represent questions, we extend Ld to L by enriching the
former’s vocabulary with “?,” “{ ,” “},” and the comma. Well-formed expressions
composed of these symbols are called e-formulas. We let Le be the set of e-formulas,
i.e., Le = L − Ld.
We use the letters A,B,C,D andQ,R as metavariables for d-wffs and e-formulas,
respectively. Arbitrary formulas of either type are ranged over by F,G,H . The let-
ters Γ,∆,Θ,Σ range over subsets of L (i.e., sets of both declarative and erotetic
formulas). Arbitrary sets of d-wffs, i.e., subsets of Ld will be ranged over by X,Υ, Z,
while the bold letters, S,T,U,V are reserved for sets of subsets of Ld. Metavari-
ables may be indexed with subscripts. All sets are assumed to be finite. We will use
‘=’ to denote both set-theoretic identity as well as syntactic equivalence of symbols.
Definition 1 (Syntax of L). L is the smallest set meeting the following criteria:
(i) If A ∈ Ld, then A ∈ L.
(ii) If A1,..., An(n > 1) ∈ Ld and A1,..., An are pairwise syntactically distinct,
i.e., non-equiform, then ?{A1,..., An} ∈ L.
(iii) Nothing else is a member of L.
IEL subscribes to the set-of-answers methodology according to which questions
are identified with the set of their possible direct answers [22]. In keeping with
this approach, we will often say that an e-formula, e.g., ?{A1,..., An}, is based
on a particular set of d-wffs, e.g., {A1,..., An}, and that members of the latter
set are the constituents of the e-formula. Such comments should not mislead the
reader into thinking that ‘?’ is an operation on sets. As evidence to the contrary,
note that it follows from Definition 1 that ?{p,¬p} and ?{¬p, p} are syntactically
distinct e-formulas. We will often refer to e-formulas as questions and to the d-wffs
3A full-blown normative-pragmatic treatment of the act of asking a question is provided by
[15, 16].
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constituting them as their direct answers. When Q =?{A1,..., An} we write dQ to
denote the set of direct answers to Q, i.e., dQ = {A1,..., An}. Since the set-notation
often becomes cumbersome, we avail ourselves of some handy abbreviations.
Definition 2 (Abbreviations). We abbreviate sets and e-formulas as follows:
• For ?{A1,..., An}, we write ?[A|n].
• For ?{A,¬A}, we write ?A.
• For Γ1 ∪ ...∪ Γn and S1 ∪ ...∪ Sn, we write Γ|n and S|n, respectively.
• For {A1,..., An}, we write [A|n].
• For {{A1},..., {An}}, we write [A|n].
1.1. Erotetic Evocation. The concepts of erotetic evocation and implication are
explicated by means of standard, single-conclusion entailment or sc-entailment and
multiple-conclusion entailment or mc-entailment. IEL defines both quite broadly
so as to accommodate a diversity of underlying languages. Since our focus here is
only on instances of these relations that are formulated in CPL, we will simply use
entailment in that logic for the first semantic relation and will define mc-entailment
accordingly. Thus, we assume a Boolean valuation, v that assigns a truth value, 1
or 0, to each atom in Ld and extends to all d-wffs in the usual manner by using
the Boolean functions corresponding to the connectives. By v(A) = 1 we mean
“d-wff A is true under valuation v.” The definitions for sc- and mc-entailment are
straightforward.
Definition 3 (SC-Entailment, X  B). X  B if and only if there is no valuation
v such that v(A) = 1 for every A ∈ X and v(B) = 0.
Definition 4 (MC-Entailment, X⊫Υ ). X⊫Υ if and only if there is no valuation
v such that v(A) = 1 for every A ∈ X and v(B) = 0 for every B ∈ Υ .
Before defining our target erotetic inferences, we introduce two useful concepts.
The first is the property of soundness that a question possesses when at least one
of its direct answers is true. In CPL, the soundness of a question may defined as
follows.
Definition 5 (Soundness in CPL). A question, Q is sound under v iff v(
∨
dQ) = 1.
The second concept captures the relation between a set of declaratives X and a
question Q such that it is impossible that all the d-wffs in X are true, but no direct
answer to Q is true. When this relation holds, we say that Q is sound relative to
X .
Definition 6 (Relative Soundness). A question Q is sound relative toX iffX⊫ dQ.
1.2. Erotetic Implication. We now define erotetic evocation.
Definition 7 (Erotetic Evocation (EE), E(X,Q)). A set of d-wffs, X evokes a
question, Q, i.e., E(X,Q) if and only if
(i) X⊫ dQ, and
(ii) ¬∃A ∈ dQ(X  A).
The first condition for erotetic evocation requires that an evoked question, Q
has a true direct answer if the evoking set consists of truths, in other words, that
Q is sound relative to X . The second condition ensures that evoked questions are
informative relative to X , i.e., that the evoking premises do not entail an answer.
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The latter makes EE a defeasible relation in the sense that a question that is evoked
by X will not be evoked by a proper superset of X that includes formulas that sc-
entail a direct answer to Q.
We now define erotetic implication and the species of that relation that consti-
tutes our second target. In keeping with the literature on IEL, this definition uses
‘⊂’ to denote the proper inclusion of sets.
Definition 8 (Erotetic Implication (EI), Im(Q,X,Q1)). A question Q implies a
question Q1 on the basis of a set of d-wffs X , i.e., Im(Q,X,Q1), if and only if
(i) ∀A ∈ dQ(X ∪ {A}⊫dQ1), and
(ii) ∀B ∈ dQ1 ∃Υ ⊂ dQ s.t. Υ 6= ∅ (X ∪ {B}⊫Υ ).
The first condition for erotetic implication says that the implying question, to-
gether with a set of auxiliary d-wffs, X , must mc-entail the set of direct answers
to the implied question. This condition ensures that the truth/soundness of the
declarative/erotetic premises is transmitted to the erotetic conclusion. In other
words, if all of X are true, Q is sound, and Im(Q,X,Q1), then Q1 is sound.
The second condition guarantees that Q1 is cognitively useful relative to X and
Q. By ‘cognitively useful,’ we mean that each direct answer to the implied question
should, together with the declarative premises, narrow down the class of possible
direct answers to the implying question.
We will focus on a special kind of erotetic implication, namely, regular erotetic
implications. Such a restriction is desirable because regular erotetic implication is
transitive. This means that our sequent calculus will enjoy a cut rule that applies
to e-formulas as well as to d-wffs.
Definition 9 (Regular Erotetic Implication (R-EI), Imr(Q,X,Q1)). A question Q
regularly implies a question Q1 on the basis of a set of d-wffsX , i.e., Imr(Q,X,Q1),
if and only if
(i) ∀A ∈ dQ(X ∪ {A}⊫dQ1), and
(ii) ∀B ∈ dQ1 ∃A ∈ dQ(X ∪ {B}  A).
Corollary 1 (Transitivity of R-EI). If Q regularly implies Q1 on the basis of X,
and Q1 regularly implies Q2 on the basis of X, then Q regularly implies Q2 on the
basis of X.
When the set of auxiliary d-wffs is empty, the relation of erotetic implication is
said to be pure.
Definition 10 (Regular Pure Erotetic Implication (RP-EI), Imrp(Q,Q1)). A ques-
tion Q regularly and purely implies a question Q1, i.e., Imrp(Q,Q1), if and only
if
(i) ∀A ∈ dQ({A}⊫dQ1), and
(ii) ∀B ∈ dQ1 ∃A ∈ dQ({B}  A).
As we shall demonstrate, proper subsets of provable sequents in our calculus are
sound and complete with respect to the definitions of R-EI and RP-EI.
2. A Sequent Calculus for Defeasible Reasoning
We will now present our sequent calculus for defeasible reasoning. We employ
the standard notation for sequents composed of sets of formulas—e.g., Γ, A ⊢ B,∆.
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Formulas on the left side of the turnstile are called the antecedent ; on the right side
they are called the succedent. Commas in the antecedent are read conjunctively
and those on the right are read disjunctively. The formula with the connective in
a rule is the principal formula of that rule, and its components in the premises are
the active formulas. The remaining elements of sequents are referred to as side
formulas.
Sequents in our calculus represent rules of inference. As such rules are inher-
ently normative, we interpret sequents as representing a relationship that preserves
a particular normative status, namely, entitlement. Thus, a provable sequent tells
us that anyone who is entitled to the formulas in the antecedent is entitled to at
least one of those in the succedent. Of course, ‘entitlement to a formula’ is at
best elliptical for ‘entitlement to do something with that formula’. So, our reading
of sequents requires a further, pragmatic layer of interpretation. In particular, a
provable sequent says that anyone entitled to assert the declaratives and ask the
questions in the antecedent is entitled to assert or ask at least one of the declar-
atives/questions in the succedent. This is the normative-pragmatic interpretation
that underwrites our proof theory. While sequents represent rules of entitlement-
preserving inference, the rules of our calculus are meta-rules of inference—i.e., they
tell us what rules of inference are legitimate given the axioms.
The sequents in our calculus depart from the standard form in two respects: just
below our turnstile we add a set of sets of d-wffs, S, called a defeater set and to
the far left of the turnstile we add a set of formulas, Σ, called a background set.
Σ | Γ
S
∆
Defeater sets ‘describe’ situations in which one is not permitted to draw the
inference represented by the sequent. In line with our normative-pragmatic reading
of sequents, we can think of the elements of (members of) the defeater set as
those declaratives entitlement to which prohibits entitlement to draw the inference
represented by the sequent.
We interpret background sets as consisting of information to which a reasoner
is beholden when she draws an inference, but which does not serve as a premise
and from which the conclusion is not said to follow. Having such a device in our
formalism enables us to capture an important aspect of defeasibility, namely, that
the introduction of new information may jeopardize prior inferential commitments
even when that information does not serve as fodder for new inferences. These
sets also serve a technical role in our system since they often expand in the course
of a derivation, keeping a record, so to speak, of those formulas that ‘disappear’
from antecedents of premises. (See ∨ ⊢,→⊢,⊢→, and ¬ ⊢ in Figure 1).As we
shall see, the latter feature proves crucial to the implementation of a Gentzen-style
normalization procedure and to the establishment of a cut-elimination theorem.
Definition 11 (Defeater sets, Background sets, Defeasible Sequents). Defeater
sets are finite, possibly empty sets of d-wffs representing statements, entitlement
to which is incompatible with an entitlement to draw the inference represented
by the sequent. Background sets are finite, possibly empty sets of formulas that
represent the informational context of the inference. A defeasible sequent is a
standard sequent in which a background set (Σ) occurs on the left-hand side of the
antecedent and a defeater set (S) occurs just below the turnstile:4 Σ | Γ
S
∆.
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When no background sets have been specified (i.e., Σ = ∅) we write: · | Γ
S
∆.
When the antecedent is empty we write: Σ | ·
S
∆.
Definition 12 (Derivation, Proof, Paraproof). If a defeasible sequent, Σ | Γ
S
∆,
occurs at the root of a finitely branching tree, pi, whose nodes are defeasible sequents
recursively built up from axioms by means of the rules of LK?, then pi is said to be
a derivation of Σ | Γ
S
∆. If, additionally, each sequent in pi is undefeated, then
pi is said to be a proof of Σ | Γ
S
∆ in LK?, otherwise pi is called a paraproof of
Σ | Γ
S
∆.
The rules for LK? in Figure 1 are designed to generate trees that preserve deriv-
ability downward and undefeatedness upward. When read bottom-up, the rules
say that, “If [the conclusion sequent] is undefeated, then so is/are [the premise se-
quent/s].” Alternatively, the rules may be read top-down as permitting the conclu-
sion, given the premises, so long as the conclusion is not defeated. On either reading,
the rules are formulated to ensure that a cut-free derivation whose end-sequent is
undefeated will contain only undefeated sequents throughout. This property is im-
portant both for the establishment of cut-elimination and, more primitively, for the
reason that proofs in a system of defeasible inference should not contain defeated
sequents.
With the exception of BE,DE, ? ⊢1, ? ⊢2,⊢?1, and ⊢?2, rules that apply to declar-
ative sequents are based on [11]’s alternative to Gentzen’s LK in which rules permit
independent contexts (i.e. are multiplicative) and sequents are finite constructions
of sets of formulas, rather than constructions of sequences or multisets. Set-based
calculi of this sort obviate the structural rules for contraction and exchange and
offer a simpler proof system. As we shall see, the structural similarity between the
d-wff rules in our system and those found in set-based versions of LK is of great
help in establishing our theorems for soundness and completeness.
We now define the all-important property of defeat.
Definition 13 (E(·)). Let E(Γ) denote the set that results from removing all e-
formulas from Γ and replacing them with a disjunction of their declarative con-
stituents, i.e.
E(Γ) = {A : A ∈ Γ} ∪ {A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An : ?{A1, . . . , An} ∈ Γ}
Since the E(·) operation replaces questions with disjunctions of their direct answers,
we say that E(Γ) is the declarativization of Γ.
Definition 14 (Defeat). A sequent is defeated just in case it is possible to derive
a sequent in LK? that has empty background and defeater sets, an antecedent that
4In general, the respective roles played by control sets and soundness in Piazza and Pulcini’s
LK
S are played by defeater sets and undefeatedness in our system. Aside from various technical
differences, the crucial distinction between the two approaches is that for [19] the occurrence of
a disjunctive formula in the antecedent renders the sequent defeated (resp. unsound) if either
of the disjuncts occurs in the sequent’s defeater set (resp. control set), while in our system, the
sequent is only defeated if both disjuncts are present in the defeater set. We believe that the latter
property captures a more intuitive, less cautious conception of defeat. In order to realize this
conception in our definitions, we found it necessary to deploy substantially different operations
and have re-named the resultant concepts so as to avoid confusion. With this said, Definition 12
and Lemma 2 are taken over from [19] with little modification.
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combines the decarativized background and antecedent sets of the original sequent,
and a succedent that is a member of the original sequent’s defeater set. We define
defeat formally as follows.
Let Σ | Γ
S
D
LK?
∆ stand for the fact that Σ | Γ
S
∆ is derivable in LK?.
Σ | Γ
S
∆ is defeated iff ∃X ∈ S such that · | E(Σ ∪ Γ)
∅
D
LK?
X.
The results in section 2.1 show that this is equivalent to saying that a sequent
in LK? is defeated just in case the declarativized antecedent-cum-background set
mc-entails a member of the defeater set. But while this fact may aid the reader in
identifying defeated sequents, it does not constitute its formal definition. Rather, we
define defeat in terms of derivability in LK? and provability in terms of derivability
and defeat—thereby ensuring that all the resources needed for proof search are
internal to the system itself.
Example 1. · | p ∧ q
{{p}}
∆ is defeated.
Example 2. · | p
{{p∧q}}
∆ is undefeated.
Example 3. · | p
{{p∨q}}
∆ is defeated.
Example 4. · | p ∨ q
{{p}}
∆ is undefeated.
Example 5. · | ?{p,¬p}
{{p}{¬p}}
∆ is undefeated.
Example 6. · | ?{p,¬p}
{{p,¬p}}
∆ is defeated.
The definition of defeat is designed to redeem certain intuitions about defeasible
inferences. For instance, if we know that A defeats an inference, then we ought to
reject that inference if we are entitled to A∧B (Example 1). Conversely, if we know
that A ∧B defeats an inference, but are ignorant as to whether either conjunct by
itself defeats it, then we should not abandon the inference if we are merely entitled
to one of the conjuncts (Example 2). Similarly, if A ∨B defeats an inference, then
the inference is defeated if we are entitled to either of the disjuncts (Example 3).
Finally, if A defeats an inference, then entitlement to A ∨ B need not force us to
abandon that inference, since entitlement to B would preserve the propriety of the
inference (Example 4).
When it comes to inferences with questions among their premises, defeat should
occur when the premises entail at least one of their direct answers, for there is a
strong sense in which being entitled to ask a question (or better, to conduct an
inquiry) is incompatible with possession of its answer (resolution). Furthermore,
the fact that defeater sets are sets of sets of d-wffs enables us to distinguish between
situations in which entitlement to at least one particular direct answer prohibits
entitlement to ask the question (Example 5) and those in which entitlement to
any answer is foreclosed, i.e., when the question is unanswerable in the context
(Example 6). As we shall see, by exploiting the dynamics of the defeat mechanism,
the calculus is able to represent the defeasible character of erotetic evocation.
We note that sequents with inconsistent antecedent-cum-background sets are
defeated whenever their defeater sets are nonempty.
Lemma 1. If E(Σ ∪ Γ) is inconsistent and S 6= ∅, then Σ | Γ
S
∆ is defeated.
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Proof. According to Definition 13 and the rules for LK?, if E(Σ∪Γ) is inconsistent,
then · | E(Σ ∪ Γ)
∅
D
LK?
X for any X . By hypothesis, ∃X ∈ S. Thus, according to
Definition 14, the sequent is defeated no matter what the defeater set happens to
contain. 
Definition 15 (Compatibility, %). When a set of formulas, Γ, and a set of sets of
d-wffs, S, fail to meet the conditions of defeat, they are said to be compatible. We
use the symbol ‘%’ to denote this relationship, which we define formally as follows:
Γ % S iff ¬∃X ∈ S such that · | E(Σ ∪ Γ)
∅
D
LK?
X.
When this relation fails to hold, we say that Γ and S are incompatible and express
this by writing: Γ 6% S.
We now look at a lemma that aids understanding of the rules in our calculus.
Lemma 2. (1) If Γ ∪∆ % S and T ⊂ S, then ∆ % T.
(2) Γ ∪ {A ∧B} % S iff Γ ∪ {A,B} % S
(3) Γ ∪ {A ∨B} % S iff Γ ∪ {A} % S or Γ ∪ {B} % S
(4) Γ ∪ {¬¬A} % S iff Γ ∪ {A} % S
(5) Γ∪ ?{A1,... , An} % S iff Γ ∪ {A1} % S or. . . or Γ ∪ {An} % S
Proof. For the first sub-lemma, suppose for reductio that ∆ 6% T. From Definition
15 it follows that · | E(Γ ∪∆)
∅
D
LK?
X for some X ∈ T and since T ⊂ S, it follows
that Γ ∪∆ 6% S, contradicting the hypothesis. Each of the remaining sub-lemmas
follows directly from Definitions 14 and 15. 
2.1. The declarative rules for LK?. For clarity, we will refer to the axioms and
logical rules for d-wffs of LK?, as well as to the structural and cut rules whose active
and principle formulas are exclusively d-wffs, as the declarative rules, d-wff rules or
simply LKd
?. As we mentioned above, LKd
? is based on Ketonen’s formulation of
LK—a formulation whose primary characteristics are multiplicative rules for con-
nectives and set-based sequents. In fact, if we ignore the background and defeater
set notation and as well as the rules that govern their manipulation, i.e., we restrict
ourselves to LKd
?\{BE∪DE}, then we have a system that is structurally similar to
LK
{} in [3, p. 64] and Gcl∗ in [21, p. 7], and that is isomorphic to LK0 in [20, p.
711].5 This means that we can avail ourselves of the normalization procedure for
set-based formulations of LK and for LK0 in particular.
Of course, the rules DE and BE are not superfluous. They play an important
role in cut-elimination, as shown in [19]. They also help the system capture impor-
tant episodes in defeasible reasoning—namely, instances when one’s knowledge of
potential defeaters (DE) or relevant features of the context (BE) expands.
The rules ∨ ⊢,→⊢,⊢→, and ⊢ ¬, preserve undefeatedness upwards by exploiting
the background set device. To illustrate this property, we focus on ⊢ ¬. This rule
adds the (active) antecedent of the premise to the background set of the conclusion.
Such behavior is of a piece with the explanation given for background sets above—
they act as a kind of record of those formulas that appear on the left-hand side of
a turnstile in the premises but not in the conclusion.6 An informal interpretation
5Aside from construing sequents as constructions of sets, and hence rendering rules for con-
traction and exchange redundant, LK0 is distinguished by its use of atomic singletons for axioms,
i.e., p ⊢ p.
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of the rule (read upwards) can be given as follows: if one is entitled to (assert) ¬A
while A is in one’s background set of entitlements, then one is entitled to whatever
follows from A once it has been removed from that background set and entitlement
to its negation has been renounced. The presence of A in the background set of the
conclusion thus ensures that the premises are undefeated whenever the conclusion
is.
Lemma 3. Any cut-free derivation in LKd
? is a proof if and only if its end-sequent
is undefeated, i.e., undefeatedness is preserved upwards in cut-free proofs in LKd
?.
Proof. For all of the rules in LKd
?, the undefeatedness of the premises follows di-
rectly from that of the conclusion by way of Lemma 2. 
Lemma 4. Any sequent that is provable in LKd
? has a cut-free proof.
Proof. The normalization procedure for LKd
? is just that of LK0, modulo the rules
BE and DE. But since the latter do not generate occasions for cut, their addition
is innocuous. The main challenge posed by proofs of defeasible sequents is the
fact that as cut is permuted upward in reducing derivations, the accumulation of
antecedents and background sets occasionally generates defeated sequents in the
derivation that were not present in the original one. Here is an example:
pi1
...
p | Γ
{{r}}
q
pi2
...
· | Γ′
S
r
⊢∧
p | Γ′,Γ
{{r}}∪ S
q ∧ r
pi3
...
· | q, r
T
∆
∧ ⊢
· | q ∧ r
T
∆
cut
p | Γ′,Γ
{{r}}∪S∪T
∆
£
pi1
...
p | Γ
{{r}}
q
pi3
...
· | q, r
T
∆
cut
p | Γ, r
{{r}}∪T
∆
pi2
...
· | Γ′
S
r
cut
p | Γ′,Γ
{{r}}∪S∪T
∆
Notice that the defeated sequent p | Γ, r
{{r}}∪T
∆ does not appear in the first
proof but does in the second. Thus, we have moved from a proof to a paraproof. To
be certain that the elimination of cut from the final reduction does not produce a
paraproof, we must know that the cut-free derivation of an undefeated end-sequent
is a proof, and we do know this in virtue of Lemma 3. Therefore, the normalization
procedure for LK may be applied to proofs in LKd
?. 
With the establishment of cut-elimination for the d-wff proofs of LK?, we can
see that the structural isomorphism between LKd
?\{BE ∪ DE} and LK0 (minus
background and defeater set notation) gives LK? some important properties.
Definition 16. Let X ⊢LK0 Υ stand for the fact that X ⊢ Υ is provable in LK0.
6By this same reasoning, the cut rule also ought to add the active formula in its premises to
the background set of the conclusion. However, the cut rule is exempted on the grounds that
such a rule is just a statement about the conditions under which information may be removed
from a proof.
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Lemma 5. If Σ | X
S
Υ is provable in LKd
?, then X ⊢LK0 Υ .
Proof. From Definition 12 and the isomorphism between the rules of LKd
? and those
of LK0. 
Lemma 6. There is a proof of Σ | X
∅
Υ in LKd
? iff X ⊢LK0 Υ .
Proof. From Definition 14 it follows that a sequent with an empty defeater set
is provable just in case it is derivable in LK?. Call X ⊢ Υ the LK-analogue of
Σ | X
S
Υ. Since a sequent is derivable in LK? just in case its LK-analogue is
provable in LK0, we obtain our result from Lemma 5. 
Lemma 6 implies that the consequence relation encoded by
∅
in LKd
? corre-
sponds to the consequence relation encoded by LK0. The former is of course not
the only consequence relation encoded by LKd
?, let alone by LK?. Since consequence
relations in the latter are individuated by defeater sets, there are countably infin-
itely many potential consequence relations in LK?. Naturally, many of these will
not be well-behaved by standard criteria. Nonetheless, classes of these consequence
relations will have important properties, and, as we shall show, some of these are
sound and complete with respect to our target erotetic relations. Before proceeding
to demonstrate this, we draw out some of the semantic implications of the above
lemmas.
Since LK0 is sound and complete for CPL, it follows that if X ⊢LK0 Υ, then X
mc-entails Υ, i.e.
Lemma 7 (⊢LK0⇔ ⊫). X ⊢LK0 Υ iff X⊫Υ
From Lemmas 5 and 7, we can derive:
Lemma 8. If Σ | X
S
Υ is provable in LKd
? then X⊫Υ , for arbitrary Σ and S.
From Lemmas 6 and 7, we can derive:
Lemma 9. Σ | X
∅
Υ is provable in LKd
? iff X ⊫Υ for an arbitrary Σ.
Recall that proofs in LK? must contain undefeated sequents. It follows that, so
long as a defeasible sequent contains a nonempty defeater set, it is possible that
there will be no proof of it in LKd
?, despite the fact that the antecedent mc-entails
the succedent. As a system for defeasible reasoning, it is to be expected that certain
patterns of otherwise classically valid reasoning simply will not be permitted in
LK
?. Thus, Lemma 8 only says that LKd
? is sound with respect to mc-entailment.
However, if the defeat mechanism is bypassed in virtue of the fact that the defeater
set is empty (Lemma 9), the resulting class of sequents will be both sound and
complete.
Finally, these insights allow us to redeem our earlier claim that a sequent is
defeated just in case the declarativized antecedent-cum-background set mc-entails
a member of the defeater set.
Corollary 2. Σ | Γ
S
∆ is defeated iff ∃X ∈ S such that E(Σ ∪ Γ)⊫X.
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2.2. The erotetic rules for LK?. We now turn to the right and left rules for
e-formulas in LK? (i.e., ⊢?1,⊢?2, ? ⊢1, and ? ⊢2). Since right and left rules for
connectives in a sequent calculus correspond, respectively, to the introduction and
elimination rules in natural deduction, we will say that the rules ⊢?1 and ⊢?2 gov-
ern the introduction of e-formulas and that ? ⊢1 and ? ⊢2 govern their elimination.
The reader may wonder why there are two pairs of introduction and elimination
rules. The reason stems from IEL’s distinction between erotetic evocation and
erotetic implication. Both inference types have questions as their conclusions, but
while the premises of the latter also include a question, those of the former do
not. To capture evocation, we need a rule that permits the introduction (elimi-
nation) of e-formulas in sequents whose antecedents (succedents) consist solely of
d-wffs, while representing implication requires a rule that permits such introduction
(elimination) in cases when the antecedents (succedents) also contain e-formulas.
Indeed, it is natural to think that assertions license questions in a manner that
differs from the way questions license further questions. In normative-pragmatic
terms, the crucial difference is that entitlement to ask one question licenses the
asking of another question when resolving the latter resolves the former, i.e., when
the implied question promises to ‘move inquiry along.’ Formulating two versions of
each introduction and elimination rule is one way to respect this difference.
Let’s examine ⊢?1. If we omit reference to background sets and side formulas, we
can read the rule top-down as saying that anyone entitled to assert some statement
in the set {A1,..., An} is thereby entitled to ask the question ?{A1,..., An}, so long
as she is not entitled to assert any particular member of that set.
While this rule is intended to capture erotetic evocation, it actually represents a
more general relationship, since the succedents of the premise and conclusion may
include a set of side formulas composed of d-wffs and/or e-formulas. The generality
of the rule is motivated by the desire to formulate rules for e-formulas that conform
to the standard format of those for LK. It also helps to satisfy cut-elimination. As
we shall see, when there are no side formulas and the background set is empty, the
rule faithfully depicts erotetic evocation.
The first condition of the evocative relation is satisfied by the fact that the
succedent of the premise, i.e.{A1,..., An}, contains all of the constitutes of the
question in the succedent of the conclusion, i.e., ?{A1,..., An}. Satisfying the second
condition of erotetic evocation, however, requires significant exploitation of the
defeat mechanism. Recall that this condition prohibits evocation whenever the set
of d-wffs sc-entails a constituent of the evoked question. By including singletons
of each direct answer in the defeater set of the conclusion, ⊢?1 guarantees that the
set of auxiliary d-wffs does not sc-entail a direct answer to the evoked question.
Since defeat is defined as a relation between the d-wffs in the antecedent-cum-
background set on one hand, and members of the defeater set on the other, the
inclusion of direct answers as separate sets permits X to fulfill the second condition
without jeopardizing its satisfaction of the first.
Example 7 illustrates the dynamics of defeat for sequents involving e-formulas.
In the example, {p} and {q} both belong to the defeater set of the end-sequent,
thereby ensuring that neither of these formulas is derivable from the antecedent.
But since {p, q} is not in the defeater set, the sequent is undefeated.7
7To save space, we will simply write ‘∅’ in defeater sets whose composition is technically ∅∪ ∅.
This notation is employed merely as a convenience; the rules remain multiplicative not additive.
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Example 7. · | p ∨ q
{{p},{q}}
?{p, q}
ax.
· | p
∅
p
ax.
· | q
∅
q
∨ ⊢
· | p ∨ q
∅
p, q
⊢?1
· | p ∨ q
{{p},{q}}
?{p, q}
Let us now consider the right-rule for e-formulas, ? ⊢1. Bypassing background
sets and side formulas, the rule says that anyone entitled to (at least one member
of) a set of assertions, X , on the basis of her entitlement to assert A1 or . . . or An is
also entitled to X on the basis of her entitlement to ask the question ?{A1,..., An}.
The observant reader will no doubt have noticed that ? ⊢1 is but an expanded
version of the classical elimination rule for ∨. This overlap is to be expected, since
questions in IEL for classical logic presuppose that at least one of their possible
answers is true. However, ? ⊢1 is not equivalent to ∨ ⊢ in LK
? since ,inter alia the
former is restricted to declarative succedents, while the latter is not.
We now turn to the second introduction rule for e-formulas, i.e., ⊢?2. Ignoring
background sets and side formulas, this rule may be read top-down as follows: any-
one entitled to assert B1 or . . . or Bm on the basis of her entitlement to ask the
question ?{A1,..., An} and whose entitlement to assert any member of {B1,..., Bn}
licenses her to an answer to that question, is thereby entitled to ask the question
?{B1,..., Bn}. As noted, the rule is intended to capture the relation of regular
erotetic implication. The left-most premise roughly corresponds to the first con-
dition on R-EI, according to which an answer to the implying question, together
with the set of d-wffs, entails that there is a true answer to the implied question.
The premises to the right roughly correspond to the second condition, according
to which, an answer to the implied question, together with the set of d-wffs, en-
tails an answer to the implying question. Admittedly, ⊢?2 encodes less restrictive
conditions than those imposed by R-EI insofar as it permits side formulas of either
the declarative or erotetic kind to occur in the antecedent or succedent. Again,
this liberalization brings the rule into conformity with standard rules in classical
sequent calculi.
Here is an example of a proof involving ⊢?2.
8
Example 8. p, q, r | ?{p, q ∨ r}
∅
?{p, q, r}
ax.
· | p
∅
p
ax.
· | q
∅
q
ax.
· | r
∅
r
∨⊢
q, r | q ∨ r
∅
q, r
?⊢1
q, r | ?{p, q ∨ r}
∅
p, q, r
ax.
· | p
∅
p
ax.
· | q
∅
q
RW
· | q
∅
q, r
⊢∨
· | q
∅
q ∨ r
ax.
· | r
∅
r
RW
· | r
∅
q, r
⊢∨
· | r
∅
q ∨ r
⊢?2
p, q, r | ?{p, q ∨ r}
∅
?{p, q, r}
Finally, we turn to ? ⊢2. Again, ignoring background sets and side formulas,
we read the rule top-down as follows: anyone who is entitled to ask the question
?{B1, . . . , Bm} on the basis of entitlement to assert any statement from the set
8Again, we will simply write ‘∅’ in defeater sets whose composition is technically ∅∪∅, ∅∪∅∪∅∪∅,
or ∅ ∪ ∅ ∪ ∅ ∪ ∅ ∪ ∅ ∪ ∅ ∪ ∅ ∪ ∅.
14 J. MILLSON
{A1,..., An} and who is entitled to assert some statement in the latter on the basis
of her entitlement to assert any statement in {B1, . . . , Bm}, is thereby licensed to
ask ?{B1, . . . , Bm} if she is entitled to ask ?{A1,..., An}. Recall that the motivation
behind ⊢?1 and ⊢?2 is that in order to represent EE and R-EI, a calculus needs to
distinguish between inferences in which a question follows from a set of statements
and those in which a question follows from at least one question. Symmetry de-
mands that we respect this difference in our elimination rules as well. Nevertheless,
? ⊢2 and ⊢?2 are not on equal footing, for the former is admissible in LK?, while
the latter is not.
Lemma 10 (Admissibility of ? ⊢2). The rule ? ⊢2 is admissible in LK
?, i.e., if the
premises of the rule are provable in LK?\{? ⊢2} and its conclusion is undefeated,
then the conclusion is provable in LK?\{? ⊢2}.
Proof. Suppose that the premises of ? ⊢2 are provable. Since the axioms of LK?
are declarative and since the rule only stipulates that the active formula in the first
set of premises be erotetic, the proof proceeds by considering the simplest case,
namely, that in which the active formula ?[B|m] is the only e-formula to occur in
the premises. It follows that the first set of premises in the rule, i.e., those of the
form
(I) Σi | Xi, Ai Si ?[B|m], Υi
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, must be derived either via ⊢?1 from sequents of the form
(II) Σi | Xi, Ai Si [B|m], Υi
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (Sub-case 1) or from purely declarative sequents via RW
(Sub-case 2).
Sub-case 1: If (I) are obtained from (II) by ⊢?1, then [B|m] ⊆ S|n. But, since
[B|m] is added to the conclusion’s background set, and since [B|m] 6% [B|m], the
conclusion of ? ⊢2 is defeated. Thus, there is no proof in the first place.
Sub-case 2: If the premises of the form (I) are obtained by RW, from sequents
of the form
(III) Σi | Xi, Ai Si Υi
then Σi ⊆ Σ|n+m, Xi ⊆ Γ|n+m,Si ⊆ S|n, and Υi ⊆ ∆|n+m. We thus obtain the
conclusion of ? ⊢2 by judicious applications of BE,DE, LW, and RW.
Since the first set of premises cannot be derived via ⊢?1, if they are not obtained
by RW, then they must all follow by way of ⊢?2, and thus there is at least one
erotetic side formula in the antecedent (i.e., in Γ|n). Suppose that ?[C|k] is the only
erotetic side formula in the antecedent of the first set of premises. It follows from
our supposition that sequents of the form
(IV) Σi | Xi, ?[C|k], Ai Si [B|m], Υi
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} must be provable. We apply ? ⊢1 to all of these sequents to
obtain
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(V) Σ|n | X|n, ?[C|k], ?[A|n] S|n [B|m], Υ|n
We then apply ⊢?2 to this sequent and to the remaining premises of ? ⊢2 to obtain
the conclusion.
In the case that there are additional erotetic side formulas in the antecedents of
the first set of premises, we repeat the process of rendering sequents of the form
IV into those of the form V. Once all erotetic side formulas are thus derived, we
can apply ⊢?1 or RW to obtain any erotetic side formulas in the succedent of these
premises. Judicious application of ⊢?1 and ⊢?1 (or LW and RW) will likewise yield
any erotetic side formulas in the second set of premises. We then apply ⊢?2 to
obtain the conclusion of ? ⊢2. 
In the first case considered in this proof, we observe an interesting phenomena—
namely, when any sequent in the first set of premises in ? ⊢2 is derived via ⊢?1, the
result is a paraproof. This occurs in virtue of the fact that the constituents of the
implied question are added (as singletons) to the defeater set of ⊢?1’s conclusion and
hence carry down into ? ⊢2’s conclusion, while at the same time those constituents
are added as formulas to the conclusion’s background set. It is this interaction
between the ? ⊢2 and ⊢?2 that prevents the latter’s admissibility.
Proposition 1 (Non-admissibility of ⊢?2). The rule ⊢?2 is not admissible in LK?.
Proof. To prove admissibility, we would have to derive ⊢?2’s conclusion when ?[A|n]
is the only e-formula that occurs in the rule. There are three ways to obtain the first
premise (i.e., Σ1 | X1, ?[A|n] S1 [B|m], Υ1) under this condition. In the first case,
all of the active formulas in the premise are obtained by weakening. To recover the
conclusion of ⊢?2 we simply apply LW,RW,BE and DE as needed.
In the second case, the first premise is obtained by LW from a sequent of the
form:
(VI) Σ1 | X1 S [B|m], Υ1.
Since VI has a declarative antecedent, we must use ⊢?1 to get
(VII) Σ1 | X1 S∪ [B|m]
?[B|m], Υ1
Now, to arrive at the conclusion of ⊢?2 we must apply, inter alia BE in order to
get [B|m] into the background set. But since [B|m] 6% [B|m] the resulting sequent is
defeated and there is no proof.
Finally, in the third case, the first premise is obtained by ? ⊢1 from a set of
sequents with the following form (omitting subscripts for auxiliary sets):
(VIII) Σ | X,Ai S [B|m], Υ
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We must apply ? ⊢2 to this set to obtain the desired conclusion
of ⊢?2. To prepare sequents of form VIII to serve as premises in an application of
? ⊢2, the e-formula ?[B|m] must occur in their succedents. Since their antecedents
are declarative, we must apply ⊢?1 to each of them. But as in the second case, this
forces [B|m] into their defeater set. Since the conclusion of ? ⊢2 will contain [B|m]
in its background, the resulting sequent is defeated.
Thus, unlike the proof of ? ⊢2’s admissibility, where it was shown that all of the
sequents in the first set of premises could be obtained by applying the declarative-
succedent rule ? ⊢1 followed by ⊢?2 to yield erotetic side formulas, we cannot obtain
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the first premise of ⊢?2 by applying the declarative-antecedent rule ⊢?1 followed by
? ⊢2, since applying ⊢?1 will render the desired conclusion defeated.
The only instance in which the conclusion of ⊢?2 can be obtained from the
premises in LK?\{⊢?2} is when all the active formulas in the rule are obtained by
weakening, i.e., the first case. 
In virtue of the admissibility of ? ⊢2 and the non-admissibility of ⊢?2, the major
results that follow will utilize ⊢?2 whenever possible, obviating consideration of
? ⊢2.
Before moving on to our main results, we pause to prove that undefeatedness
is preserved upward in all cut-free proofs in LK?. As we shall see, this property
plays an important role in our proofs of soundness and completeness and of cut-
elimination.
Lemma 11. Any cut-free paraproof in LK? is a proof if and only if its end-sequent
is undefeated, i.e., undefeatedness is preserved upwards in cut-free proofs in LK?.
Proof. Lemma 3 establishes the thesis for all cut-free proofs in LKd
?. The remaining
proofs therefore involve application of one or more of the erotetic rules. Since there
is no change to the defeater sets or antecedents in ⊢?1, this rule obviously preserves
undefeatedness upwards. As for ? ⊢1, Lemma 2.5 shows that it would be possible
for the conclusion to be undefeated when one of the premises is defeated. This
possibility, however, is blocked by the addition of the eliminated questions’ possible
answers, i.e., A1, . . . , An, to the conclusion’s background set, in a manner similar
to ∨ ⊢,→⊢,⊢→,⊢ ¬. The same is done with respect to the constituents of the
implied question in ⊢?2 and to those of both the implied and implying question in
? ⊢2. 
3. Soundness and Completeness Results for LK?
We will now show that a particular class of defeasible sequents in LK? is sound
and compete with respect to the definitions of EE and R-EI.
Theorem 1 (Soundness with respect to EE).
If · | X
[A|n]
?[A|n] is provable in LK
?, then E(X, ?[A|n]).
Proof. According to Definition 7, E(X, ?[A|n]) just in case X⊫[A|n] and ¬∃Ai ∈
[A|n](X  Ai). Since the only way to prove · | X [A|n] ?[A|n] is to apply ⊢?1, and
since undefeatedness is preserved upwards (Lemma 11), it follows by hypothesis that
· | X
∅
[A|n] must be provable. Hence, by Lemma 9, X⊫[A|n]. If · | X [A|n] ?[A|n]
is provable, then it is undefeated and hence, by Lemma 7, E(∅∪X) 3 Z for any Z ∈
[A|n]. It follows that X 2 A for any A ∈ [A|n]. Thus, ¬∃Ai ∈ [A|n](X  Ai). 
Remark 1. It follows from Lemma 8 that E(X, ?[A|n]) also holds when Σ | X [A|n]
?[A|n] is provable in LK
? where Σ 6= ∅.
Theorem 2 (Completeness with respect to EE).
If E(X, ?[A|n]), then · | X [A|n] ?[A|n] is provable in LK
?.
Proof. If E(X, ?[A|n]), then X⊫[A|n], and hence, by Lemma 9, · | X ∅ [A|n] is
provable. Now apply ⊢?1 to derive · | X [A|n] ?[A|n]. Since the background set is
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empty, the result is only a paraproof if X 6% [A|n]. But if X 6% [A|n], then X⊫Z
for some Z ∈ [A|n] and thus it is not the case that E(X, ?[A|n]). 
Corollary 3 (Soundness and Completeness).
E(X, ?[A|n]) iff · | X [A|n] ?[A|n] is provable in LK
?.
Proof. Follows from Theorems 1 and 2. 
We now establish soundness and completeness for R-EI.
Theorem 3 (Soundness with respect to R-EI).
If Σ, [A|n], [B|m] | X, ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m] is provable in LK
?
for an arbitrary Σ, then Imr(?[A|n], X, ?[B|m]).
Proof. Σ, [A|n], [B|m] | X, ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m] can only be obtained by weakening (Case
1) or via ⊢?2 (Case 2), since or ? ⊢2 is admissible.
Case 1: Consider the following proof:
ax.
· | p
∅
p
¬⊢
· | p,¬p
∅
LW
· | p,¬p, ?{q, r}
∅
RW
· | p,¬p, ?{q, r}
∅
?{s, t}
BE
q, r, s, t | p,¬p, ?{q, r}
∅
?{s, t}
Imr(?{q, r}, {p,¬p}, ?{s, t}) follows from the fact that A,¬A⊫ dQ∗ for an arbi-
trary Q∗ and that ‘⊫’ is monotonic.
Case 2: The following must be provable:
(IX) Σ, [A|n] | X, ?[A|n] ∅ [B|m]
Likewise, for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there must exist Ai ∈ [A|n] such that
(X) Σ | X,Bj ∅ Ai
is provable. Thus, by Lemma 9, for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} there exists Ai ∈
{A1, . . . , An} such that X,Bj  Ai.
The only way of obtaining (IX) is by applying ? ⊢1, since there is no other rule
(save for LW, covered in the first case) that permits the introduction of an e-formula
into an antecedent of a sequent which has a strictly declarative succedent. So each
sequent of the form:
(XI) Σ | X,Ai ∅ [B|m]
is provable. Thus, by Lemma 9 X,Ai⊫ [B|m] for each Ai ∈ [A|n].

Remark 2. Imr(?[A|n], X, ?[B|m]) also holds when Σ | X, ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m] is provable
for an arbitrary Σ, since Σ, [A|n], [B|m] | X, ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m] may be obtained from
it via BE with no threat of defeat.
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Theorem 4 (Completeness with respect to R-EI).
If Imr(?[A|n], X, ?[B|m]), then Σ, [A|n], [B|m] | X, ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m]
is provable in LK?for an arbitrary Σ.
Proof. Suppose that Imr(?[A|n], X, ?[B|m]). It follows from Lemma 9 that the
premises of ⊢?2 are provable with empty defeater sets. More precisely, Σ | X,Ai ∅
[B|m] is provable for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and via ? ⊢1 we obtain Σ, [A|n] | X, ?[A|n] ∅
[B|m]. Likewise, it follows from our supposition that for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} there
exists Ai ∈ [A|n] such that X,Bj ⊫Ai. Hence, by Lemma 9, the corresponding
sequent Σ | X,Bj ∅ Ai is provable. We then apply ⊢?2 to obtain Σ, [A|n], [B|m] |
X, ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m]. Since the defeater set is empty, the derivation is a proof. 
Corollary 4 (Soundness and Completeness).
Imr(?[A|n], X, ?[B|m]) iff Σ, [A|n], [B|m] | X, ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m].
Proof. Follows from Theorems 3 and 4. 
Finally, we have sequents that are sound and complete with respect to Regular
Pure Erotetic Implication, i.e., RP-EI.
Corollary 5 (Soundness and Completeness).
Imrpu(?[A|n], ?[B|m]) iff Σ | ?[A|n] ∅ ?[B|m] is provable in LK
?
for an arbitrary Σ.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 4. 
4. Cut-Elimination
Having established the soundness and completeness of certain classes of conse-
quence relations in LK?, we can now examine the global properties exhibited by
the calculus, most importantly, that of cut-elimination. Naturally, the proofs of
completeness (Theorems 2 and 4) can be used to establish cut-elimination for the
cases accounted for by these theorems. That is, they show that cut need not be
used to prove sequents corresponding to erotetic evocation and implication. Our
aim in this section, however, is to establish cut-elimination as a general property
of LK?.
Before proceeding to our proof of cut-elimination, it is important to note that
some applications of cut will never produce proofs and therefore do not require
normalization.
Lemma 12. pi is a paraproof if its last rule is the cut of an e-formula, Q, which is
principal in applications of ⊢?1 and ? ⊢1 in pi.
Proof. Since the constituents of Q are added as a set of singletons, i.e.,
{{A1}, . . . , {An}}, to the defeater set of ⊢?1’s conclusion and since the set of
constituents, i.e., A1, . . . , An, is added to the background of ? ⊢1’s conclusion,
an application of cut to those sequents yields the following: Σ′,Σ, A1, . . . , An |
Γ, ?{A1,..., An} S∪{{A1},...,{An}} X . Since, e.g., · | A1, . . . , An ∅
D
LK?
A1, this se-
quent is defeated. Therefore, the result of any application of cut to the e-formula
that is principle in the conclusions of ⊢?1 and ? ⊢1 will be a paraproof. Here is an
illustration.
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pi′
...
Σ0 | X S [A|n]
⊢?1
Σ0 | X
S∪ [A|n]
?[A|n]
pi′′1
...
Σ1 | Γ1, A1 T1 Υ
pi′′n
...
. . . Σn | Γn, An Tn Υ
? ⊢1
Σ|n, [A|n] | Γ|n, ?[A|n] T|n Υ
cut
Σ0 ∪ Σ|n, [A|n] | Γ|n, X S∪ [A|n]∪T|n
Υ
Since [A|n] 6% [A|n], the end-sequent is defeated.

Once again, we observe the interaction between background and defeater set
expansions that produces paraproofs in a manner previously noted in Lemma 10
and Proposition 1.
We can now proceed to our cut-elimination theorem.
Lemma 13. Any sequent that is provable in LK? has a cut-free proof.
Proof. Lemma 4 establishes cut-elimination for LKd
?. The remaining proofs there-
fore involve one or more of the erotetic rules. Since ⊢?1 and ? ⊢1 are restricted
versions of ⊢ ∨ and ∨ ⊢, respectively, we can reason from Lemma 4 that cut-based
proofs involving these rules will admit of normalization. From Lemma 12, it follows
that there is no need to provide a parallel reduction of ⊢?1\? ⊢1.
As ? ⊢2 is admissible (Lemma 10), we restrict our attention to cut-based proofs
involving ⊢?2. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: cut is applied to a d-wff. Since d-wffs only occur as side formulas in the
conclusion of ⊢?2, such cases are structurally analogous to cuts on side formulas of
∨ ⊢’s conclusion and therefore their normalization follows from Lemma 4.
Case 2: The cut rule is applied to an e-formula. There are three sub-cases
depending on whether the e-formula occurs active, principle, or as a side formula
in the conclusion of ⊢?2.
Sub-Case 2a: Consider the derivation that results from cutting an e-formula,
?[A|n], that occurs principle in the succedent of ⊢?1 and is active in the antecedent
of ⊢?2. For the sake of concision, we introduce the following terminology: we
refer to the first premise of an instance of ⊢?2 as its α premise, i.e., α = Σ1 |
Γ1, ?[A|n] S [B|m],∆1, and refer to the remaining premises as the instance’s β
premises. Obtaining the α premise for ⊢?2, via ? ⊢1 requires that [A|n] be added
to the conclusion’s background set. The downward expansion of background sets
entails that [A|n] will occur in the end-sequent’s background set. From ⊢?1, we know
that [A|n] will occur in the end-sequent’s defeater set. But since [A|n] 6% [A|n], the
end-sequent will be defeated. Again, there will be no cut-based proof.
Alternatively, the α premise may be obtained by LW which adds the e-formula
?[A|n] to the antecedent without thereby bringing [A|n] into the background set. In
such a case, however, the proof must contain a sequent that does not include the
cut formula. The conclusion can thus be recovered by weakening and expansion
(i.e., BE and DE).
Sub-Case 2b: Consider the derivations in which the principle formula of ⊢?2
is cut, i.e., ?{B1, . . . , Bm}. There are three sub-cases depending on whether the
?{B1, . . . , Bm} occurs active, principle, or as a side formula in the second premise
of cut. When it is active, the succedent of the second premise in cut contains at
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least one e-formula, and therefore ⊢?2 occurs in the branch above it. We thus
need a parallel reduction of ⊢?2/ ⊢?2. To reduce the proof, we permute cut up-
ward and apply it to both α premises and again to each of the corresponding β
premises. Below is a simplified example of this reduction. To conserve space, we
omit background sets, assume identical defeater sets for sub-proofs, and restrict the
e-formulas involved to those for yes/no questions. Once again, these measures are
only taken for convenience; the rules should not be construed as additive.
pi1
...
Γ, ?A S B,¬B
pi2
...
Γ, B S A
pi3
...
Γ,¬B S A
⊢?2
Γ, ?A S ?B
pi5
...
Γ, B T C,¬C
pi6
...
Γ,¬B T C,¬C
?⊢1
Γ, ?B T C,¬C
pi7
...
Γ, C T B
pi8
...
Γ,¬C T ¬B
⊢?2
Γ, ?B T ?C
cut
Γ, ?A S∪T ?C
£
pi1
...
Γ, ?A S B,¬B
pi5
...
Γ, B T C,¬C
cut
Γ, ?A S∪T ¬B,C,¬C
pi6
...
Γ,¬B T C,¬C
cut
Γ, ?A S∪T C,¬C
pi7
...
Γ, C T B
pi2
...
Γ, B S A
cut
Γ, C S∪T A
pi3
...
Γ,¬B S A
pi8
...
Γ,¬C T ¬B
cut
Γ,¬C S∪T A
⊢?2
Γ, ?A S∪T ?C
We now consider the case when ?{B1, . . . , Bm} occurs principle in the second
premise of cut, i.e., Σ | Γ, ?{B1, . . . , Bm} S ∆. This sequent must be derived via
? ⊢1 or ? ⊢2. But, again, as the latter is admissible, we focus on the former. Thus,
sequents of the form Σi | Γi, Bi S ∆ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n must occur in the branch
above. Since the α premise’s succedent contains B1, . . . , Bm, reduction is achieved
by iterated applications of cut.
Lastly, if ?{B1, . . . , Bm} occurs as a side formula in the antecedent of the second
premise of cut, then the latter is permuted upward and applied to ⊢?2’s α premise.
Sub-Case 2c: If the e-formula cut from ⊢?2’s conclusion is a side formula, then
reduction is achieved in the fashion analogous to that of cuts on side formulas in
LK, in keeping with Lemma 4.

Corollary 6 (Subformula Property). If a sequent is provable in LK?, then it is
provable analytically, i.e., by means of a derivation in which all formulas are sub-
formulas of those occurring in the end sequent.
Proof. The result follows by induction on the length of cut-free proofs. 
Lemma 14 (Invertibility of the Erotetic Rules). If the conclusion of ? ⊢1, ? ⊢2,⊢?1,
or ⊢?2 is provable, then so is (are) its premises.
Proof. Straightforward by induction on proof height. 
While it is not our intention to work out the details of proof-search in LK?, we
can sketch the approach. Suppose that we wish determine whether Σ | Γ
S
∆
is provable LK?. The first step is to determine whether the sequent is defeated,
since, if it is, then it has no proof. But as defeat is defined in terms of derivability
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in LK?, this step itself requires a search for derivations. To do so, we construct a
set, S, of sequents with the form · | E(Σ ∪ Γ)
∅
Xi for each Xi ∈ S. We then
conduct a derivation search on each of these sequents. Since the members of S are
declarative sequents with empty background and defeater sets, and since the rules
of LKd
? are just those of the set-based calculus LK0 modulo BE and DE, we may
proceed in the manner of the standard proof search algorithm for LK (e.g. [3, p.
295]), with the caveat that sequents are constructed of sets and thus the rules for
contraction and exchange are obviated. If we find a derivation for a member of S
then we know the original sequent is defeated and there is no proof. If the derivation
search terminates without a derivation, however, then it is undefeated and, thanks
to Lemma 11, we know that it has a proof just in case it has a derivation. We thus
conduct a derivation search on the original sequent, in keeping with the standard
proof search algorithm for LK.9 Further departures from the standard algorithm
are attributable to the complexity of the rules for e-formulas.
5. The admissibility of PMCE
As mentioned in the introduction, [25] has axiomatized erotetic evocation for
the sequent calculus PMCE. In this section, we demonstrate that the axioms and
primitive rules of PMCE are respectively derivable and admissible in LK
S?.
As with LK?, PMCE is defined over the language of classical propositional logic
syntactically enriched to incorporate e-formulas. But whereas LK? extends the
sequent calculus for classical logic, PMCE deals with a restricted class of sequents
known as e-sequents, which take the following form:
(XII) X ⊢?{A1,..., An}
where ?{A1,..., An} is an e-formula as defined in L. As (XII) illustrates, the an-
tecedents of e-sequents are restricted to possibly empty sets of d-wffs while succe-
dents are restricted to single e-formulas.
Axioms in PMCE are defined as follows.
Definition 17 (Axioms in PMCE, Complementary Literals ). The sequent ⊢
?{D1,..., Dn} is an axiom of PMCE if and only if (1) either each Di(1 ≤ i ≤ n)
is a literal or a disjunction of literals none of which are complementary and (2)
D1 ∨ ... ∨ Dn does involve complementary literals. Two literals are said to be
complementary if one of them is the negation of the other.
To prove the derivability of these axioms in LK?, we start with the following
lemma.
Lemma 15. If {A1,..., An} is composed solely of complementary literals or dis-
junctions that do not have complementary literals as subformulas, A1∨...∨An does
involve complementary literals, and n > 1, then Σ | ·
∅
A1,... , An is provable in
LK
?, for an arbitrary Σ.
9Matters are slightly complicated by the presence of BE and DE in LK?. However, since the
background and defeater sets of any sequent are finite, we know that there is an upper bound
to the number of derivations for any end-sequent containing a nonempty background or defeater
set.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on proof height. Base Case: Suppose that
{A1,..., An} consists of two complementary literals, e.g., {p,¬p}. We obtain
· | ·
∅
p,¬p via application of ⊢ ¬ to the axiom introducing p.
Inductive Step: Assume that there is a proof of ·
∅
p,¬p with height n and let
Σ | ·
∅
A1,..., An be the root of a proof of height n+1, where {A1,..., An} is a set
of disjunctions that do not involve complementary literals, but A1∨...∨An does. It
follows that at least one atomic formula is the subformula of an element of the set
and its negation is that of another. Suppose that p is that atom. Σ | ·
∅
A1,..., An
is derivable from · | ·
∅
p,¬p via BE and the rules of LKd
?.

Theorem 5. If ⊢?{A1,... , An} is an axiom in PMCE, then
Σ | ·
[A|n]
?{A1,... , An} is provable in LK
? when Σ % [A|n].
Proof. Lemma 15 establishes that Σ | ·
∅
A1,..., An is provable in LK
?, where
{A1,..., An} is composed solely of complementary literals or disjunctions that do not
have complementary literals as subformulas, A1 ∨...∨An does involve complemen-
tary literals, and n > 1. Σ | ·
[A|n]
?{A1,..., An} is derivable from Σ | · ∅ A1,..., An
via ⊢?1. Since by hypothesis, Σ % [A|n], Σ | · [A|n] ?{A1,..., An} is undefeated and
therefore provable. The thesis then follows according to Definition 17. 
Definition 18 (Primitive Rules of PMCE). There are four primitive rules in PMCE.
Note that Ai denotes any arbitrary formula in {A1,..., An}.
R1
X ⊢?{A1,..., An, B} X ⊢?{A1,..., An, C}
Provided that (B ∧C) 6= Ai.
X ⊢?{A1,..., An, B ∧ C}
R2
X ⊢?{A1,..., An, B}
where (B ↔ C) is a theorem of CPL and C 6= Ai.
X ⊢?{A1,..., An, C}
R3
X ⊢?{B → A1,..., B → An}
X,B ⊢?{A1,..., An}
R4
X ⊢?{A1,..., An}
where d?{A1, . . . , An} = d?{B1, . . . , Bm}.
X ⊢?{B1,..., Bm}
We proceed to demonstrate that these rules are admissible in LK?. Since sequents
in LK? contain background and defeater sets which are not present in the sequents
of PMCE, the admissibility of these rules needs to be clarified.
Definition 19 (LK?-correlate). Let S be a sequent, Σ | X
S
?{A1,..., An}, such
that if it is provable in LK? then there is no sequent S ′ = Σ′ | X
S
′ ?{A1,..., An}
provable in LK? for which either Σ′ ⊂ Σ or S′ ⊂ S. S is said to be the LK?-correlate
of the sequent X ⊢?{A1,..., An, } in PMCE.
While the background and defeater sets of LK?-correlates are not specified, nei-
ther are they arbitrary. Rather, they should be the smallest sets with which a
A CUT-FREE SEQUENT CALCULUS FOR DEFEASIBLE EROTETIC INFERENCES 23
sequent composed of its antecedent and succedent is provable in LK?. We may
safely assume that proofs for LK?-correlates, if they exist, do not make use of BE
or DE.
Definition 20 (Admissibility of PMCE rules in LK
?). A rule R of PMCE is ad-
missible in LK? iff there is a provable LK?-correlate of its conclusion if there is a
provable LK?-correlate of its premise(s).
Lemma 16 (Admissibility of R1). The primitive rule R1 of PMCE is admissible in
LK
?.
Proof. Assume that Σ′ | X
[A|n]∪{{B}}
?{A1,..., An, B} and Σ′′ | X [A|n]∪{{C}}
?{A1,..., An, C} are provable LK?-correlates of the premises in R1. From Lemma
14, it follows that Σ′ | X
∅
A1,..., An, B and Σ
′′ | X
∅
A1,..., An, C are provable.
Σ | X
∅
A1,..., An, B ∧ C follows via ⊢ ∧. By applying ⊢?1, we obtain Σ |
X
[A|n]∪{{B∧C}}
?{A1,..., An, B ∧ C}, the LK?-correlate of the conclusion in R1
. 
Lemma 17 (Admissibility of R2). The primitive rule R2 of PMCE is admissible in
LK
?.
Proof. Assume that Σ | X
[A|n]∪{{B}}
?{A1,..., An, B} is a provable LK?-correlate
of the premise in R2. From Lemma 14 it follows that Σ | X ∅ A1,..., An, B is
provable. Let B ↔ C be a theorem of CPL where C 6= Ai. From Lemma 9, it
follows that Σ′ | X
∅
A1,..., An, C is provable (where it may be that Σ
′ 6= Σ).
We apply ⊢?1 to obtain Σ′ | X [A|n]∪{{C}}
A1,..., An, C, the LK
?-correlate of the
conclusion in R2. 
Lemma 18 (Admissibility of R3). The primitive rule R3 of PMCE is admissible
in LK?.
Proof. Suppose that Σ, B | X
S
?{B → A1,..., B → An} is provable in LK
? where
S = {{B → A1}, . . . , {B → An}}. From Lemma 14, it follows that Σ, B | X ∅
B → A1,..., B → An is provable. From ⊢→ it follows that Σ | X,B ∅ Ai, . . . , Aj
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n (where it may be that i = j). If needed, we apply RW to obtain Σ |
X,B
∅
A1, . . . , An and apply ⊢?1 to the latter to obtain Σ | X,B S ?{A1,..., An},
the LK?-correlate of the conclusion in R3. 
Theorem 6 (Admissibility of Primitive Rules of PMCE). The primitive rules
R1, R2, R3, R4 of PMCE are admissible in LK
?.
Proof. The admissibility of R1, R2 and R3 is established by Lemmas 16, 17 and 18.
The admissibility of R4 is straightforward and its proof is left as an exercise for the
reader. 
To our eyes, LK? has several advantages over PMCE. The most obvious is that
LK
? encodes rules for erotetic implication and that its rules for erotetic evocation
capture that relation’s defeasible character. But we also believe that it is consider-
ably easier to construct proofs in LK?, e.g., Example 7, than to conduct proof-search
in PMCE, since the latter deploys axioms that must meet complicated syntactic con-
straints. Moreover, the proviso on R2 shows that PMCE must appeal to external
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considerations—i.e., the theorems of CPL—in order to construct proofs, whereas
LK
? is a self-contained and self-sufficient calculus. Finally, LK? permits sequents
with multiple e-formulas occurring on either side of the turnstile, while sequents in
PMCE can only contain one e-formula and only in the succedent. For this reason,
LK
? appears to have greater expressive power.
6. Conclusion
This paper has sought to advance the formal treatment of erotetic inferences
by providing a proof theory for defeasible and transitive species of the inferences
studied by IEL. We have constructed a sequent calculus that (1) encodes defeasibil-
ity at the level of the turnstile; that (2) contains classes of consequences relations
which are sound and complete for erotetic evocation (Corollary 3), regular erotetic
implication (Corollary 4), and regular pure erotetic implication (Corollary 5); and
that (3) provides introduction and elimination rules for erotetic formulas. When
combined with the fact that the rules of PMCE are admissible in our calculus,
these results demonstrate that our proof theory surmounts the limitations of [25]’s
system.
One way in which LK? might be fruitfully developed would be to extend it
in a such a way as to capture the general relation of erotetic implication, i.e.,
Im(Q,X,Q1) (Definition 8). To do so, we might let Θi,Θj stand for nonempty
proper subsets of [A|n], i.e., Θi,Θj ∈ P([A|n])/{∅, [A|n]}. By replacing Ai, Aj in
⊢?2 with Θi,Θj , respectively, it may be possible to obtain a rule that yields sequents
that are sound and complete with respect to erotetic implication. Similar changes
would need to be made to ? ⊢2.
Unfortunately, such an extension could not represent the relation of strong
erotetic implication (Ims(Q,X,Q1)), a restriction of erotetic implication to those
instances in which the set of declaratives does not mc-entail a nonempty proper
subset of direct answers to the implying question. Strong erotetic implication is
thus defeasible in a manner similar to erotetic evocation. To formulate rule(s) corre-
sponding to Ims(?[A|n], X, ?[B|m]) we would need to add all nonempty proper sub-
sets of constituents of the implying question to the conclusion(s)’s defeater set—i.e.,
P([A|n])/{∅, [A|n]} ⊆ S. Note, however, that the conclusion of ? ⊢2 contains [A|n]
in its background set and that the first premise of ⊢?2, whether obtained by ? ⊢1 or
? ⊢2, will also have [A|n] in its background set. Since [A|n] 6% P([A|n])/{∅, [A|n]},
any such rule for strong erotetic implication would uniformly yield praraproofs. So
capturing strong erotetic implication would require substantial modification to the
calculus.
Since we have sketched the contours of proof search in LK?, another direction of
development would be to construct a tool for finding proofs. Given the computa-
tional benefits of a cut-free sequent system, the development of such a tool would
not be terribly difficult. We invite future research in this area.
Finally, we take our results as indicating the fruitfulness of normative-pragmatic
interpretations of erotetic inferences. Since the normative-pragmatic rendering for
inferences is associated with proof-theoretic or inferentialist approaches to seman-
tics, we would be interested to see whether LK?, or some similar system, might serve
as the basis for a proof-theoretic semantics of questions. As such approaches rely
on the formulation of introduction and/or elimination rules for logical connectives,
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the fact that our calculus provides these rules for question-forming expressions sug-
gests that such an endeavor has some prima facie plausibility. Once again, we
invite future research in this area.
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Σ1 | Γ1, A1 S1 X. . .Σn | Γn, An Sn X
? ⊢1†
Σ|n, A1, . . . , An | Γ|n, ?{A1, . . . , An} S1∪...∪Sn X
Σ1 | Γ1, ?[A|n] S [B|m],∆1 Σ2 | Γ2, B1 T1 Ai,∆2 . . .Σm+1 | Γm+1, Bm Tm Aj ,∆m+1
⊢?2 ‡
Σ|m+1, [B|m] | Γ|m+1, ?[A|n] S∪T|m ?[B|m],∆|m+1
Σ1|Γ1, A1 S1 ?[B|m],∆1. . .Σn|Γn, An Sn ?[B|m],∆n Σn+1|Γn+1, B1 T1 Ai,∆n+1. . .Σn+m|Γn+m, Bm Tm Aj ,∆n+m
? ⊢2‡
Σ|n+m, [A|n], [B|m] | Γ|n+m, ?[A|n] S|n∪T|m ?[B|m],∆|n+m
† Provided n > 1 and A1, . . . , An are non-equiform.
‡ Provided Ai, Aj ∈ {A1, . . . , An}; m,n > 1 ; A1, . . . , An are pairwise non-equiform; and B1, . . . , Bn are pairwise non-equiform.
Figure 1: Rules for LK?
